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Abstract:  
 
There has been a prominent stream of research investigating internationalisation of organisations. 
While the importance of transaction costs in the governance decisions of firms has been well 
established in the literature, transaction cost theory (TCT) in family firms remains underutilised. 
We examine the impact of family governance (i.e. family ownership and involvement in 
management and the board of directors) on internationalisation within the domain of TCT using 
386 S&P 500 firms. Our findings indicate an inverted U-shaped relationship between family 
ownership and internationalisation and a U-shaped relationship between family’s involvement in 
management and the board and internationalisation. This illustrates the interesting differential 
impact of the components of family involvement on internationalisation. We conclude by 
discussing future research and implications for practice. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Even though family firms form a major portion of national economies throughout the world 
(Dyer and Handler, 1994), the primary focus of internationalisation research has been on non-
family firms (except for, Arregle et al., 2012; Calabrò and Mussolino, 2013; Graves and Thomas, 
2003, 2006, 2008; Liang, Wang and Cui, 2014; Mitter et al.,   2014; 
Tsang, 2001; Sciascia et al., 2012, 2013; Zahra, 2003). Additionally, many of the challenges 
family firms face regarding internationalisation and other strategic choices remain unclear from a 
theoretical and practical perspective (Dyer, 2003; Hoy and Verser, 1994). 
 
Family business researchers recently investigate the link between family’s involvement in 
businesses and internationalisation. Sciascia et al. (2013) show a non- linear J-shaped 
relationship between family involvement on the board of directors and sales internationalisation 
in the USA. In Austria, Mitter et al. (2014) find an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
family influence and internationalisation. A study by Calabrò and Mussolino (2013) 
demonstrates positive effects of board independence and relational norms and trust on family 
firms’ export intensity in Norway. In China, Liang, Wang and Cui (2014) show an inverted U-
shaped relationship between family management and internationalisation and a U-shaped 
relationship between family ownership and internationalisation. A recent review by Pukall and 
Calabrò (2014) draws attention to mixed findings regarding family influence on 
internationalisation in family firms and calls for more studies investigating how different 
governance structures influence family firms’ internationalisation. 
 
Chua, Chrisman and Sharma (1999, p.25) define a family business as “a business governed 
and/or managed with the intention to shape and pursue the vision of the business held by a 
dominant coalition controlled by members of the same family or a small number of families in a 
manner that is potentially sustainable across generations of the family or families”. Consistent 
with this definition, family firms are identified by family ownership and family involvement in 
governance and management (Chrisman, Chua and Litz, 2003). In addition to these components, 
the ‘essence’ of the family firm derives from the intentions to maintain current and 
transgenerational family control, family firm-specific resources and capabilities, a vision for 
value creation, and pursuance of that vision (Chrisman, Chua and Litz, 2003). Unique to family 
firms, the identification with and emotional attachment of family members to the firm, family 
control, social ties, and transgenerational renewal through succession generate socioemotional 
wealth (Berrone, Cruz and Gomez-Mejia, 2012). Thus, family influence is the key factor that 
distinguishes among family firms as well as between family firms and non-family firms. 
 
According to Kontinen and Ojala (2010), some studies investigating family firms’ 
internationalisation lack theoretical grounding and the studies that have been done focus 
primarily on firms in the manufacturing sector. Moreover, those authors also draw attention to 
the need for longitudinal research on larger firms as well as consideration of various levels of 
family ownership and family management. Strategic decisions that determine internationalisation 
appear to be of particular importance to the performance and long-term success of family firms, 
yet we still do not know enough about the determinants of such decisions in the family business 
literature. Therefore, distinctive factors  affecting  strategic  decisions,  specifically  concerning  
the internationalization activities and the idiosyncratic conditions influencing such decisions in 
family firms deserve more research attention. 
In an attempt to fill this gap in the literature, this empirical paper addresses two important 
research questions regarding internationalisation in family firms: 
 
1. How does family ownership impact internationalisation? 
2. How does family’s involvement in management and the board of directors impact 
internationalisation? 
 
Unlike small- and medium-sized family firms where ownership and management are usually 
overlapping (Carney, 2005), our focus on publicly traded family firms requires that we 
distinguish between active family control (i.e. family involvement in management and the board) 
and passive family control (i.e. family ownership) (Maury, 2006). We use the transaction cost 
theory (TCT) concepts of human asset specificity, opportunism versus trust, and risk aversion to 
explain how family’s involvement in publicly traded family firms through ownership and 
participation in management and the board of directors influences internationalisation. We 
develop and test our model on 386 firms in the S&P 500 through panel data analyses. 
 
This paper contributes to the family firm literature in several ways. First, the use of TCT to 
understand the internationalisation of family firms helps to illustrate how the distinctive 
transaction cost factors in family firms affect their strategic decisions. This adds to our 
knowledge about family firms and emphasises the utility of TCT applications (Gedajlovic and 
Carney, 2010; Memili, Chrisman and Chua, 2011a; Memili, Chrisman, Chua, Chang and 
Kellermanns, 2011b; Verbeke and Kano, 2010). Second, we contribute to a better understanding 
of the differences among family firms, specifically based on different levels of family ownership 
and family’s involvement in management and/or the board that are likely to have a material 
impact on decision-making and internationalisation. Third, rather than following a simplistic 
approach by investigating whether family firms internationalise more or less than non-family 
firms, we illustrate that the impact of family’s involvement on internationalisation is a complex 
one with differential non-linear effects of family ownership and management/board involvement. 
In summary, we contribute to the literature by providing a TCT perspective into the emerging 
theory of the family firm (Chrisman, Chua and Litz, 2004; Chrisman Chua and Sharma, 2005; 
Chua, Chrisman and Sharma 1999). 
 
2. Theoretical overview 
 
The concern of earlier internationalisation studies was on distinguishing among the phases or 
stages of the internationalisation processes (e.g., Bilkey and Tesar, 1977; Cavusgil, 1980; 
Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990; Reid, 1981; Rogers, 1962). A review by Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Ramo (2004) indicates that Johanson and Vahnle’s (1977, 1990) incremental model of 
internationalisation is commonly referred to as the stage-based model. Other approaches to 
modelling internationalisation include the life cycle model (Vernon, 1966), innovation-related 
model (Bilkey and Tesar, 1977; Cavusgil, 1980), the structural model (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
1989), the internalisation model (Buckley and Casson, 1976), and the FDI-based model (Chang, 
1995). Building on this, research started to draw attention to the importance of networks in 
internationalisation (Forsgren, 1989; Johanson and Vahlne, 1993). Then, strategic choices and 
actions, the role of founders, and the relationship between founders and internationalisation 
became important in internationalisation research (Madsen and Servais, 1997; McDougall, Shane 
and Oviatt, 1994). This led to studies examining the antecedents of internationalisation such as 
factor conditions (Heckscher and Ohlin, 1991), industry and competitive structures (Nordstrom, 
1991; Porter, 1990), market imperfections and transaction costs (Dunning, 1988; Madhok, 1997; 
Teece, 1986), ownership structure (Lindqvist, 1991), and managerial experience and decision-
making (Lindqvist, 1991; Oviatt and McDougall, 1997; Zucchella, Palamara and Denicolai, 
2007). 
 
Contemporary internationalisation studies have started to highlight the differences between 
family and non-family firms and investigate the rationale and drivers of internationalisation in 
family firms. Earlier studies generally show that family firms are less likely to internationalise 
than non-family firms owing to weak information and control systems, inward orientation, 
difficulties or reluctance in hiring external managerial talent, and fear of the loss of power and 
control (Donckels and Fröhlich, 1991; Gallo and Sveen, 1991; Gallo and Pont, 1996; Harris, 
Martinez and Ward, 1994). Recent studies show similar results (Cerrato and Piva, 2012; 
Fernández and Nieto, 2005; Graves and Thomas, 2003, 2006, 2008). 
 
Studies also highlight contingencies, such as firm size, firm age, the existence of family-owned 
business partners or alliances in foreign countries, multigenerational family’s involvement in the 
business, later generations’ majority in management, investments in technology, long-term 
orientation, profitability and growth concerns, and founder/owner interests in 
internationalisation, that can all lead family firms to internationalise (Davis and Harveston, 2000; 
Fernández and Nieto, 2005; Gallo  and Sveen, 1991; Gallo and Pont, 1996; Graves and Thomas, 
2008; Zahra, 2003). Additionally, a recent study by Sciascia et al. (2012) using a sample of 
privately owned family firms in the USA indicates that family ownership has an inverted U-
shaped relationship with internationalisation. A recent study by Arregle et al. (2012) using a 
sample of small- and medium-sized family firms in Sweden shows how non-family involvement 
in ownership and board can have an impact on family firms’ export activities. Holt’s (2012) 
commentary to this article explains how and under what conditions the family might be receptive 
to strategic initiatives concerning export activities. Sciascia et al. (2013) then examine the impact 
of family’s involvement in the board of directors on internationalisation and find a J-shaped 
relationship among a sample of US family firms. 
 
However, we still do not know enough about how family’s involvement (i.e., family ownership 
and family’s participation in management and the board) may differentially impact (Kontinen 
and Ojala, 2010; Sharma, 2004) family firms’ internationalisation and the factors affecting 
family owners, managers, and board members’ strategic decisions regarding internationalisation 
in large corporations. Unlike small-to-medium-sized family firms, where ownership and 
management are typically unified, we expect differential effects of family’s ownership and 
involvement in management and the board on internationalisation. Indeed, recent research 
highlights that family firms are heterogeneous (Chrisman, Memili and Misra, 2014; De Massis et 
al., 2012; Sharma and Nordqvist, 2008; Westhead and Howorth, 2007). Theoretically, 
recognising the heterogeneity (e.g. SME versus large family firms) is important because 
comparisons of family and non-family firms that do not take differences such as size into 
account could lead to conceptual and empirical problems. Research is therefore needed to 
explore how different levels of family’s involvement in large family firms may affect 
internationalisation. Since transaction costs and cost efficiencies are key concerns in 
internationalisation (Dunning, 1988; Madhok, 1997; Teece, 1986), we explore the impact of 
family governance on internationalisation through the lens of TCT. 
 
2.1 Transaction cost theory 
 
Economising on transaction costs is the primary concern in TCT (Williamson, 1975, 1985). 
Transactions involve both ex ante contracting costs associated with the drafting, negotiating, and 
safeguarding of an agreement and ex post contracting costs that are related to disagreements and 
conflicts that arise from contract incompleteness, and set-up, operating, and bonding costs 
(Williamson, 1985). Within the framework of contracting, the partner with the bargaining power 
(Coff, 1999) is expected to have an advantage in negotiating agreements that minimise both its 
ex ante and ex post costs. Accordingly, “the organization of economic activity is under the 
control of those who possess power” (Williamson, 1985, p.124). 
 
Williamson (1985) identifies asset specificity and behavioural uncertainty as the crucial factors 
affecting efficient boundaries of firms. Behavioural uncertainty involves bounded rationality and 
agent opportunism (Williamson, 1985). Bounded rationality suggests that individuals will behave 
‘intendedly rational, but only limitedly so’ (Simon, 1961, p.24) because of imperfections in their 
mental capacity and the information available for processing. This basically means that firms are 
unable to maximise utilities (Simon, 1955) as neoclassical economic theorists claim (Savage, 
1954), and ‘contracts are normally incomplete’ (Lafontaine and Slade, 2007, p.649). This 
inevitably leads to satisficing behaviour (Simon, 1959) to deter the potential, but unpredictable, 
opportunism (Williamson, 1985) of economic actors. Opportunism involves ‘self-interest 
seeking with guile’ (Williamson, 1985, p.47). Although bargaining in a transaction naturally 
involves the pursuit of self-interest, opportunism implies a certain amount of deception with 
regard to either the ability to fulfil the terms of the contract or willingness to put forth the 
required effort. Behavioural uncertainty and associated costs are common concerns in both TCT 
and agency theory. However, unlike agency theory’s focus on preventing or mitigating such 
problems through monitoring and control, TCT is concerned with how such problems may affect 
efficient boundaries of firms (e.g. internationalisation) and economising on costs (Madhok, 1997; 
Teece, 1986; Williamson, 1985). 
 
Another important concept in TCT is asset specificity. Asset specificity deals with the extent to 
which resources can be redeployed to other uses and entails site specificity, physical asset 
specificity, human asset specificity, and dedicated assets (Williamson, 1975, 1985). A 
fundamental premise of TCT is that high asset specificity leaves a firm vulnerable to 
opportunism owing to a paucity of opportunities to redeploy assets to other uses, which limit 
transaction alternatives (Williamson, 1981). 
 
Within the domain of TCT, Teece (1986) directs attention to the distinctive governance 
properties of multinational enterprises. According to Teece (1986), firms either internalise 
transactions or internationalise based on the efficiency properties of each option. Teece (1986) 
also suggests that internationalisation usually takes place in response to high transaction costs 
associated with internalising transactions within the boundaries of the firm. Madhok (1997) 
suggests that the main purpose of internationalisation is either to exploit an opportunity a firm 
already possesses, to strengthen an existing one, or to develop a new one. 
 
TCT’s main tenets such as trust, risk aversion, and human asset specificity intersect with family 
firms’ concern with socioemotional wealth preservation involving family control, influence, 
bonding, social ties, emotional attachment, and identification with the firm. Additionally, TCT’s 
emphasis on cost economising and efficient boundaries are relevant to families’ personalistic, 
particularistic, and parsimonious tendencies (Carney, 2005). In the following sections, we use 
TCT to examine whether and how family ownership and family’s involvement in the 
management and the board of directors of publicly traded firms influence internationalisation. By 
explaining how family’s involvement influences the strategic decisions of family firms within 
the framework of TCT, we contribute to the advancement of the theory of the family firm 
(Chrisman, Chua and Sharma, 2005; Conner, 1991). 
 
3. Hypotheses 
 
Family firms are considered distinctive owing to family ownership, management, and board 
involvement as well as a family’s intentions for the transgenerational sustainability of the firm 
(Chrisman, Chua and Sharma, 2005; Chrisman et al., 2012; Chua, Chrisman and Sharma 1999). 
Family’s involvement is significant “when a family owns all or a controlling portion of the 
business and plays an active role in setting strategy and in operating the business on a day-to-day 
basis” (Kelly, Athanassiou and Crittenden, 2000, p.27). Control of ownership, management, and 
the board of directors are critical in determining a family’s ability to influence an ongoing 
business (Sundaramurthy and Kreiner, 2008). Concentrated ownership by families in publicly 
traded firms tends to be common, despite legal restrictions on high levels of ownership (La 
Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Villalonga and Amit, 
2010). 
 
Pertinent to our study, in USA, shares in most large firms are relatively diffused, such that even 
the largest shareholder holds a modest stake in the company (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998). The 
US courts also intervene to ensure that shareholdings are dispersed (Morck and Steier, 2005). 
Furthermore, litigious shareholders and a well-developed corporate takeover mechanism can 
discipline or remove ineffective corporate insiders, including large shareholders (Morck and 
Steier, 2005). Families further sustain or enhance their power by using control enhancing 
mechanisms, which protect controlling shareholders and managers and create excess voting 
rights over their cash flow rights (Villalonga and Amit, 2006a, 2006b). For example, as of 1998, 
the Ford family owned only 6% of the shares of the Ford Motor Co., but 40% of the votes 
through utilising dual- class shares (Villalonga and Amit, 2006b). Family involvement and 
family intentions are expected to affect their vision and behaviour with regard to opportunity 
pursuance, resource acquisition and deployment, and performance. 
 
Koiranen (2003) draws attention to the combination of ownership, management, and family 
subsystems in forming a family business system. However, according to Schulze and Gedajlovic 
(2010), studies have not always distinguished between the different effects of family ownership 
and family’s involvement in management and the board on firm strategies and behaviour. On the 
one hand, family owners may desire to govern their firms in certain idiosyncratic ways. On the 
other hand, family’s involvement in management and board can facilitate family owners’ 
governing their firms in ways they desire. In some cases, family management may not always 
accompany family ownership. Indeed, some family owners may not be willing and/or able to be 
involved in management and prefer to play the role of an investor. 
 
Accordingly, Maury (2006) distinguishes between active family control (i.e. family’s 
involvement in management and the board) and passive family control (i.e. family ownership). 
However, it is uncommon for families to be involved in a firm’s management or the board of 
directors without significant ownership. Maury shows that active family control is associated 
with higher profitability compared to non-family firms, whereas passive family control does not 
affect profitability. Andres (2008) demonstrates that in Germany, family firms may perform 
better than non-family firms only when the founding family is still active either on the executive 
or the supervisory board. Andres also shows that if families only act as large shareholders 
without board representation, their firms’ performance does not differ from that of non-family 
firms. Westhead and Howorth (2006) also find that family management, rather than family 
ownership, is associated with performance in firms in the UK. Parallel to the above studies, in 
this paper, the differential impact of a family’s involvement in management and the board is 
distinguished from the impact of family ownership. 
 
3.1 Family ownership and internationalization 
 
Zahra (2003) argues that family ownership significantly affects a firm’s strategic choices, which 
may include internationalisation decisions and activities. Consistent with Zahra’s (2003) 
argument, Carney (2005) indicates that ownership provides family members with the rights to 
control the use of a firm’s assets. When decision-making is affected by family members, the 
ability and willingness to make idiosyncratic decisions primarily benefiting the family increase, 
while the cost of making and implementing decisions decreases (Habbershon and Williams, 
1999; Zahra et al., 2008). As Zahra (2005) argues, ownership gives the family the discretionary 
power for the timely generation and implementation of strategic ideas. Hence, it is expected that 
internationalisation decisions will be influenced by the desires or wishes of family owners. 
 
Within the framework of TCT, human assets are the critical determinant of asset specificity 
(Williamson, 1985) and, as will be discussed below, are particularly pertinent to the strategic 
decisions of family firms. Human asset specificity is defined by the degree to which job skills are 
specific to a particular firm and the ease of metering Within the framework of TCT, human 
assets are the critical determinant of asset specificity (Williamson, 1985) and, as will be 
discussed below, are particularly pertinent to the strategic decisions of family firms. Human asset 
specificity is defined by the degree to which job skills are specific to a particular firm and 
the ease of metering individual productivity (Williamson, 1981). When job skills are highly 
transferable and metering is easy, employees can have mobility within the industry without loss 
of productivity or high replacements costs to the firms. Therefore, ‘an internal spot market labour 
relation’ (Williamson, 1981, p.565) exists and no special governance structure is necessary to 
maintain the relationship. On the other hand, when the value of human assets is based largely on 
tacit knowledge and experience and is very difficult to measure, clan organisation is an effective 
governance structure (Ouchi, 1980; Williamson, 1981). In a clan organisation, differences 
between individual and organisational goals are minimised. When individuals’ and 
organisations’ goals are aligned, the possibility of opportunism decreases. The absence of 
complex contracts, explicit auditing, and assessments lower the transaction costs in clan 
organisations. 
 
Family firms generally resemble clan organisations in that family bonds can align interests and 
reduce information asymmetries to lower governance costs (Lubatkin et al., 2005). Parental 
altruism links parent’s welfare to that of their children, which can facilitate trust, communication, 
and reciprocity (Lubatkin et al., 2005; Stark, 1995). Altruism also makes the task of metering 
productivity more difficult owing to the introduction of non-economic goals into the firm 
(Chrisman, Chua and Sharma, 2005). When altruism is reciprocal between the family business 
owners and family business members, however, the problem of opportunism is at least partially 
mitigated (Chrisman, Chua and Sharma, 2005). Consequently, family firms are likely to foster 
work environments exemplified by greater employee care, loyalty, trust, motivation and efficient 
communication (Habbershon and Williams, 1999) when reciprocal altruism prevails. 
 
On the other hand, when altruism is asymmetrical (Chrisman, Chua and Litz, 2004; Schulze et 
al., 2001; Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino 2002, 2003), family members may exhibit opportunistic 
behaviours, which owing to non-economic goals may be difficult to control (Habbershon and 
Williams, 1999; Memili et al., 2011a, 2011b). Nevertheless, research and theory suggest that 
opportunism will generally be lower in family firms than in non-family firms (Corbetta and 
Salvato, 2004; Chrisman, Chua and Litz, 2004). 
 
“Ownership provides the right to use, modify and transform, and enjoy the returns from the asset 
creating scope to both reduce the costs as well as increase the benefits from an asset due to 
superior capabilities” (Madhok, 1996, p.581). In family firms, as compared to non-family firms, 
human asset specificity is expected to be higher owing to the involvement of the family in the 
business (Gersick et al., 1997), which allows superior control over firm-specific transactions 
(Carney, 2005; Memili et al., 2011a, 2011b). 
 
Human asset specificity in firms has been measured by the amount of training (Lafontaine and 
Slade, 2007). Unlike in non-family firms, the human capital of family members in a family firm 
is developed through long apprenticeships and hands-on personalised   experience   that   provide   
an    opportunity    to    learn    while    doing (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2006; Le Breton-
Miller, Miller and Steier, 2004). These highly specific human assets of family firms based on 
tacit knowledge and experience (Penrose, 1959; Sirmon and Hitt, 2003) are not easily 
transferable, replaceable, or measurable. This may make internationalisation, requiring new 
knowledge more difficult for family firms. 
 
Williamson (1981) suggests that in cases of high asset specificity, both the buyer and the seller 
prefer exchanges that have the potential for stability and dependability. Close monitoring and 
control by family owners can improve the quality of products and services and build trust, 
goodwill (Sako, 1991), and reputation (Weigelt and Camerer, 1988) with customers with whom 
the family firm engages in repeated exchanges (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Tagiuri and Davis, 
1996; Ward and Aronoff, 1991). Indeed, family businesses seem to possess strong relationships 
with customers and other external stakeholders and good reputations consistent with the 
emphasis on socioemotional wealth and use of trust to minimise transaction costs (Aronoff and 
Ward, 1995; Dick and Basu, 1994; Habbershon and Williams, 1999; Lyman, 1991). 
 
In the USA, although blockholdership is limited in publicly traded firms by law, family owners 
can still exert influence on firm strategy and behaviour (Anderson and Reeb, 2003b; Villalonga 
and Amit, 2006a, 2006b). At low-to-moderate levels of family ownership, firm strategies and 
behaviours may resemble those of a non-family firm and economic goals may be more important 
(Chrisman et al., 2012). In such cases, family firms may place higher priority on economising 
and increasing efficiencies through internationalisation (Sirmon and Hitt, 2003). Those focussing 
on economic goals are expected to make even greater efforts to improve quality, lower fixed and 
variable costs, and increase flexibility (Memili, Chrisman and Chua, 2011; Memili et al., 2011). 
Since internationalisation can help attain these economic goals, family firms that value economic 
goals more may focus on the reduction of production costs more than transaction costs or loss of 
non-economic benefits (Memili, Chrisman and Chua, 2011; Memili et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
family firms tend to be parsimonious in the use of assets (Carney, 2005). As a result, cost 
minimisation goals and parsimonious tendencies of firms with low-to-moderate levels of family 
ownership will increase their likelihood of internationalising. The internationalisation level is 
expected to reach its highest point at moderate levels of family ownership. 
 
At higher levels of family ownership, with family’s wealth at stake, family firms are more likely 
to keep critical operations in the hands of family members to best exploit    the specific human 
assets they possess. Therefore, they may not be willing to internationalise as much as they do at 
low-to-moderate levels of family ownership since this may require external staff and expertise 
(Gómez-Mejia, Makri and Kintana, 2010), which may leave the family firm vulnerable to the 
threat of opportunism. 
 
Moreover, difficulties of monitoring international activities (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Poppo 
and Zenger, 2002; Williamson, 1985) can increase the threat of opportunism, which might 
negatively affect product or service quality and put the family firm’s reputation in danger. 
Maintaining a positive reputation is a valuable intangible asset that can lead to competitive 
advantages that outweigh contractually promised short-term cost efficiencies that are vulnerable 
to uncertainties (Leiblein and Miller, 2003). 
 
Family business owners’ integrity and self-worth are tied to the family firm’s reputation (Dutton, 
Dukerich and Harquail, 1994; Smidts et al., 2001), particularly when the firm is more visible in 
the eyes of public through higher levels of ownership. Therefore, family business owners may 
forego the potential benefits of internationalisation when family ownership is at higher levels. 
Accordingly, a recent study by Chrisman et al. (2012) shows that as family ownership increases, 
the tendency to hold family-centred non-economic goals increases because property rights 
bestow increased legitimacy and power (Chrisman et al., 2012). Indeed, family firms can avoid 
or limit agent’s opportunism and information asymmetries by using more human capital from the 
family since trust serves as a governance mechanism and a source of competitive advantage, 
lowering transaction costs substantially (Dyer and Handler, 1994; Memili et al., 2011a; Ouchi, 
1980; Sirmon and Hitt, 2003; Steier, 2001). 
 
Furthermore, the particularistic tendencies of the owning family may lead them to prefer close 
and special relations with kin and other trusted partners (Carney, 2005), which may limit the 
hiring and retention of local and foreign staff, and establishing partnerships and alliances 
necessary to internationalise. Gómez-Mejia, Makri and Kintana (2010) find that family firms 
have strong ties in their local communities, while lacking connections globally, which may 
consequently limit their internationalisation. Therefore, family firms with high levels of family 
ownership may refrain from internationalisation. 
 
Higher levels of family ownership have been associated with risk aversion and greater reliance 
on internal human and financial resources (Gómez-Mejia, Makri and Kintana, 2010; Koiranen, 
2002; Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino, 2002) owing to undiversified wealth and higher levels of 
risk-bearing. Indeed, research has shown that family business owners are more prone to be risk-
averse (Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nikel and Gutierrez, 2001; Romano, Tanewski and Smyrnios, 
2001; Schulze et al., 2001) in strategic decision- making. Given this propensity, family firms are 
more likely to be conservative and risk- averse in strategic decisions (Memili, Chrisman and 
Chua, 2011; Ward, 1997) such as internationalisation, which may require more external funding 
than domestic expansion. The degree to which a family firm is risk-averse will exacerbate the 
influence of asset specificity and opportunism on internationalisation because at every level of 
asset specificity or possible opportunism, the associated risk of internationalising will be less 
acceptable (Memili et al., 2011a). 
 
Although economic goals may be held more at low-to-moderate levels of family ownership, non-
economic goals may prevail over economic goals at moderate-to-high levels of family ownership 
(Chrisman et al., 2012). Accordingly, research and theory suggest that family firm strategies and 
behaviour are influenced by the family’s desire to preserve socioemotional value through the 
transgenerational control of the firm (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007, 2011; Chua, Chrisman and 
Sharma, 1999) and by the discretion to make idiosyncratic decisions owing to the family’s 
involvement in the business through ownership (Carney, 2005). Hence, family business owners 
may wish to pursue family-centred non-economic goals even at the expense of economic goals 
and are able to do so because they own a large portion of the firm. Chrisman et al. (2012) suggest 
that the family firm’s propensity to hold non-economic goals increases when family ownership 
increases. Indeed, higher levels of family ownership empower the family as the ultimate 
authority and allow the family to reflect its vision onto the business (Carney, 2005). In the case 
of limited accountability to third parties rooted in the personalisation of authority through higher 
levels of ownership, the owning family has the liberty to pursue family agendas involving non-
economic goals without internal or external constraints (Carney, 2005). Therefore, the family 
business owners’ concern for non-economic goals placing a great emphasis on the family may 
limit the value placed on investments, such as internationalisation. 
 
Indeed, when there is more emphasis on non-economic goals, family firms may be less 
concerned with lowering transaction costs and more willing to forego efficiency opportunities 
that could be captured by internationalisation (Sharma and Irving, 2005). Accordingly, family 
firms are expected to have greater difficulty in shedding resources and business activities than 
non-family firms (Sharma and Manikutty, 2005). This may limit the scope of their activities and 
cause them to refrain from undertaking risky business projects such as internationalisation 
(Morck and Yeung, 2003). Even though internationalisation might have the potential for 
transaction cost-efficiencies (e.g., through economies of scale), family firms may be willing to 
accept lower profits in order to reduce risk and preserve socioemotional wealth (Gómez-Mejia, 
Makri and Kintana, 2010; Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007, 2011). 
 
In addition, family wealth is closely tied to the family firm’s welfare (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003a). At moderate-to-high levels of family ownership, owing to the family’s wealth at stake 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003a), the family business owners tend to make strategic decisions, 
including internationalisation, carefully and parsimoniously (Carney, 2005; Gómez-Mejia, Makri 
and Kintana, 2010; Habbershon and Williams, 1999), which can restrict or prevent such 
activities. Indeed, owner entrenchment through higher equity levels can trigger inertia and 
attachment to the status quo. Accordingly, Chen and Hsu (2009) find a negative association 
between family ownership and R&D investment. The authors also show that R&D investment in 
family firms may increase when the roles of CEO and Board Chair are separated or when more 
independent outsiders are involved in the board. Also, Short et al. (2009) suggest that family 
firms may exhibit less autonomy, proactiveness, and risk-taking propensities. Hence, family 
business owners with moderate-to-high levels of equity may be less willing to risk the firm 
competencies by engaging in internationalisation where the firm may not be proficient, even 
when there is the potential for higher profits. Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Family ownership will have an inverted U-shaped relationship with 
internationalisation in publicly traded family firms. 
 
3.2 Family’s involvement in management and the board and internationalization 
 
Active family control is manifested through family’s involvement in management and the board 
(Maury, 2006). By being involved in management and the board, family members can have a 
greater influence on firm strategies and behaviour as compared to when family members are only 
involved in ownership as passive investors. As noted above, the threat of opportunism among 
family managers and board members is considered lower than the threat of opportunism among 
non-related managers, external board members, or business partners. 
 
Trust within the family and towards selected business partners is a self-reinforcing social control 
mechanism substituting for complex contracts and lowering transaction costs of finding 
exchange partners, negotiating, and monitoring the execution of projects (Gulati, 1995). Even a 
few family members involved in top management, the board can ensure the family’s influence in 
corporate governance (Villalonga and Amit, 2006a, 2006b). At lower levels of family’s 
involvement in management and the board, family managers and board members may be 
focussing more on enhancing control over the business and may be more risk-averse. In that 
case, internationalisation can impose the threat of opportunism as close monitoring and control 
will be more difficult when only a small number of family managers and board members are at 
the helm. Therefore, up to a certain level of family involvement, family managers and board 
members are expected to prefer to minimise internationalisation activities in order to contain 
risk. 
 
However, at moderate-to-high levels of family involvement, family managers and family board 
members may have less concern regarding the loss of control and the potential opportunism of 
external parties since they have greater ability to monitor and enforce strategic preferences 
through their managerial and board positions. This can enable family managers and board 
members to formulate and implement aggressive business strategies with potentially high 
returns, including internationalisation. Furthermore, at moderate-to-high levels of family’s 
involvement, family managers and board members are more visible to the public compared to 
family owners who may be passive. In such situations, internationalisation can lead to 
reputational benefits, which is of particular importance to families (Dyer and Whetten, 2006). 
Hence, family firm leaders tend to make a concerted effort to build a positive image and 
reputation for the firm, which can set the stage for and facilitate internationalisation activities. 
 
Family members’ pride derived from a positive reputation of themselves and their firm facilitates 
their willingness to engage in mutual monitoring (Sundaramurthy and Kreiner, 2008), mitigating 
opportunism in family firms. Close monitoring and control by family managers and board 
members also elevate the quality of activities and help build goodwill and trust with stakeholders 
(Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Sako, 1991; Tagiuri and Davis, 1996; Ward and Aronoff, 1991; 
Weigelt and Camerer, 1988). Indeed, family businesses seem to develop and sustain strong 
relationships with internal and external stakeholders (Aronoff and Ward, 1995; Dick and Basu, 
1994; Habbershon and Williams, 1999; Lyman, 1991) that help to establish a strong positive 
image and encourage investments in growth-oriented initiatives, such as internationalisation. 
 
Moreover, the longer time horizon derived from an intention for continuing family control of the 
firm can help its leaders avoid managerial myopia (James, 1999; Upton, Teal and Felan, 2001) 
and direct efforts towards maintaining trust and enduring relationships with stakeholders (Zahra, 
2005). For example, close monitoring and control by family managers and board members with a 
long-term perspective can lead to a higher priority being given to the quality of all business 
activities, which can facilitate successful internationalisation. The long-term orientation that 
occurs when the firm is viewed as a legacy for future generations also increases the value of 
developing strong relationships built on goodwill and trust with stakeholders. Indeed, family 
managers and board members that make business decisions based on a long-term commitment to 
both the family and the firm seem to develop stronger reputations with internal and external 
stakeholders based on the family name (Aronoff and Ward, 1995; Dick and Basu, 1994; 
Habbershon and Williams, 1999; Lyman, 1991). Since successful internationalisation can 
improve the firm’s reputation and relationships with stakeholders, family managers and board 
members, whose self-esteem and self-worth are tied to the family’s continuing control of the 
business (Dutton, Dukerich and Harquail, 1994; Smidts et al., 2001), may be more motivated to 
ensure that the firm implements and succeeds at internationalisation. 
 
Long-term orientation generates enduring relationships with key stakeholders by demonstrating 
to them that they are here for the long haul and committed to serve their long-term needs 
(Aronoff and Ward, 1995; Dick and Basu, 1994; Habbershon and Williams, 1999; Lyman, 
1991). Accordingly, fast-growing, high-performing family firms have been found to develop 
long-term goals and strategies (Upton, Teal and Felan, 2001) and emphasise long-term financial 
performance. As a result, long-term investments in internationalisation can promote the success 
of family firms across generations (Zahra, Hayton and Salvato, 2004) by encouraging family 
firm leaders to focus on building customer trust and loyalty and protect their family name and the 
positive image of their firm in the stakeholders’ eyes (Dyer and Whetten, 2006). Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Family management will have a U-shaped relationship with 
internationalisation in publicly traded family firms. 
 
4. Data and methodology 
 
A panel design was used for this study. Data from the Thompson One Corporate Development, 
Hoover’s, and Mergent Online databases were analysed on a restricted sample of firms based on 
publicly available data for the lag years 2002, 2004, and 2006 regarding ownership, 
management, and control variables and the years 2003, 2005 and 2007 regarding the dependent 
variable (i.e. internationalisation). Consistent with previous studies investigating publicly traded 
family firms, the sample came from firms listed in the S&P 500 (e.g. Anderson and Reeb, 2003a, 
2003b, 2004; Short et al., 2009). Missing data lowered the sample size to 386. The S&P 500 
stock market index is maintained by Standard & Poor’s and involves 500 large-cap firms, 
covering about 75% of the US equity market. Anderson and Reeb (2003a) suggest that families 
are present in one-third of the S&P 500. However, unlike privately held family firms, those in 
the S&P 500 are likely to have substantial numbers of non-family shareholders. Hence, this 
sample may not be representative of small- and medium-sized firms or privately held firms. 
 
4.1 Variables 
 
4.1.1 Dependent variable 
 
Internationalisation (INT) was measured as the percentage of foreign revenue to total revenue 
(Ruigrok and Wagner, 2003). Data on internationalisation were obtained from the Thompson 
One Corporate Development database for 2003, 2005 and 2007. Average annual total revenue of 
the firms in our sample is approximately US $12 billion, ranging between US $0.06 billion and 
US $166.09 billion. Of this amount, 35% of total revenue is from foreign sales with a range of 0–
83% of total revenue. 
 
4.1.2 Independent variables 
 
Family ownership (FO) is the percentage of total firm ownership held by members of a family 
(Chrisman et al., 2012). Average family ownership is about 1.69%, ranging between 0% and 
48%. Family’s involvement in management and the board (FM) is the number of individual 
family members, who are in top management and/or the board of directors. Family members 
participating in both management and board are only counted once. The consideration of both 
the family’s participation in management as well as the board is done to distinguish between 
active (i.e., family holds at least one of the top management and/or board position) and passive 
family control (Andres, 2008; Astrachan et al., 2002; Handler, 1989; Maury, 2006; Zahra, 2003). 
For non-family firms, both family ownership and family management and board membership 
values are zero. The squared family ownership (FO2) and the squared family management (FM2) 
variables were used to capture potential non-linear relationships between the independent 
variables and dependent variables. For robustness tests, the proportion of family members in 
management and/or the board of directors (PFM) to the total number of managers and board of 
directors was also calculated. Data for the years 2002, 2004 and 2006 were collected from the 
Thompson One Corporate Development, Hoover’s, and Mergent Online databases for these 
variables. 
 
4.1.3 Control variables 
 
Variables that were expected to influence internationalisation were included as controls. Data 
from Thompson One Corporate Development for the years 2002, 2004 and 2006 were collected 
for these variables. Larger companies may have internationalisation advantages over small- and 
medium-sized firms owing to economies of scale. Hence, firm size (FS) was controlled and 
measured through the log of the number of employees (Chrisman et al., 2012). In our sample, the 
firms’ average number of full-time and part- time employees is 36,000, ranging between 336 and 
418,000 employees in any given year. In addition, older firms may have the advantage of a 
history of past successes, which can influence their internationalisation. Firm age (FA) was 
measured as the number of years the firm has been in existence since founding. Additionally, 
family firms may have competitive advantages in some industries compared to others (Chrisman 
et al., 2010; Pollak, 1985), which can influence internationalisation (Buckley and Casson, 1976; 
Sciascia et al., 2012; Zahra, 2003). The firms in our sample have been in business for about 60 
years with a large standard deviation of 45 years. The range is between 2 and 211 years. Primary 
firm industry (FI) was measured by classifying all firms into one of four industrial categories:  
 
1  retail 
2  service 
3  manufacturing 
4  others, following Chrisman et al. (2010). 
 
Three categorical variables, coded 1–0, were created to indicate retail, service, and 
manufacturing firms. Firms in other industries were coded as zero for each variable. A total of 38 
firms are in retail, 105 are in service, 151 are in manufacturing, and 92 are in other categories. 
 
Additionally, generational majority in management and the board was controlled since family 
influence tends to be weaker when it is more dispersed or fractionalised owing to the 
involvement of later generations (Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino, 2003; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007).  
Two categorical variables, coded 1–0, were created to indicate whether first-generation (GEN1) 
or second-generation or later (GEN2) family members were in majority in the firm’s 
management and the board of directors. Non- family firms were those coded as zero for each of 
these two variables. In total, 77 of the firms listed are family firms in our sample. 
 
Institutional owners such as mutual or pension funds may also play a significant role in corporate 
decision-making (Anderson and Reeb, 2004), including internationalisation. Institutional 
ownership (IO) is the percentage of overall institutional ownership of voting shares outstanding. 
Similarly, ownership by other insiders can also influence decision- making (Anderson and Reeb, 
2004) and internationalisation. Hence, other insiders’ ownership (OIO), which is the equity 
holdings of top managers and directors minus family managers and directors’ ownership, was 
controlled to capture the incentive effects of ownership by other insiders (Anderson and Reeb, 
2004). 
 
Firm risk (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a, 2004) may be another factor that can influence 
internationalisation since firms with high levels of risk may eschew investments that influence 
risk-bearing. Firm risk (FR) was measured as the standard deviation of stock returns for the 
previous 60 months, following Anderson and Reeb (2003a, 2004). 
 
Investment in R&D may also be related to internationalisation. As R&D intensity can lead to 
innovation and growth, it can influence both foreign revenue and total revenue, depending on the 
type of innovation that occurs. Hence, this variable was controlled. R&D intensity was included 
as a control using the R&D-to-sales ratio (Memili, Fang and Welsh, 2015; Miller et al., 2007). 
 
4.2 Analyses 
 
Table 1 provides variable means, standard deviations, and Table 2 presents the results of the 
fixed effects Tobit models, with internationalisation as the dependent variable. Hypotheses 1 and 
2 were tested through Tobit panel data analysis for lag years which are 2003, 2005 and 2007 for 
the dependent variable and 2002, 2004 and 2006 for the controls and independent variables. 
Panel data analysis allows stronger causal inference and increased statistical power over cross-
sectional design. NLOGIT version 4.0 Econometric software was used. The fixed effects Tobit 
estimation model was selected to control for omitted variables that differ between cases but are 
constant over time. Tobit fixed effects estimation was used to adjust for the large number of zero 
observations (Maddala, 1991). Using OLS with censored or truncated data can produce biased 
estimates due to omitted variable problem. Maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) produces an 
efficient and consistent estimator to control stated issues. Hence, Tobit fixed effects estimation is 
an MLE appropriate technique for the data set we have used in this paper (Long, 1997; 
McDonald and Moffitt, 1980). Prior to running the analyses, the normality of the distributions of 
the variables was examined by graphing the distributions and examining the skewness and 
kurtosis. The variables which were not normally distributed were transformed (e.g. log of firm 
size). Additionally, variance inflation factors for the variables were calculated. VIFs range 
between 1.10 and 3.24. Collinearity was not a problem since all VIFs were less than 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the panel data analyses, Model 1 was the base model where the control variables were entered. 
Manufacturing and service industries, firm age, R&D, first generation’s majority in board and 
management, second or later generation’s majority in board and management, and firm risk were 
significant and retail industry was marginally significant. The log likelihood function was                
–2,246.04. In Model 2, the independent variables were entered. In support of Hypothesis 1, the 
family ownership (FO) variable was positive and significant (β = 1.27, p < 0.001) and the square 
of family ownership (FOS) was negative and significant (β = -0.02, p < 0.05). 
 
Family’s involvement in management and the board (FM) was negative and significant (β =        
–13.24, p < 0.001) and family’s involvement in management and the board squared (FMS) was 
positive and significant (β = 2.06, p < 0.05). The log likelihood function for the second model 
was –2,232.91. Hence, Hypothesis 2 is also supported. 
 
4.3 Robustness tests 
 
The results were compared to the pooled model through OLS regression. The results of OLS 
were consistent with the Tobit panel data analyses. A robustness test using the proportion of 
family managers and/or the board of directors (PFM) as an independent variable also yields 
results consistent with our primary analysis. 
 
To test for endogeneity, instrumental variables for both family ownership and family’s 
involvement in management and the board were used. Since this is Tobit panel data, the Wald 
test was performed for both of these cases to test for exogeneity using Stata 11 software. 
Concerning the endogeneity of family ownership, GEN1 and GEN2 instrumental variables were 
used. For family’s involvement in management and board variable, the instrumental variables 
were again GEN1 and GEN2. The Wald test results indicated that the instrumental variables for 
family ownership were significant (χ2 =  15.02, p = 0.0001) and we found similar results for 
family’s involvement in management and the board (χ2 = 8.92, p = 0.0028). Hence, the results of 
Wald test showed that family ownership and family’s involvement in management and the board 
variables can be considered as exogenous. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
In this paper, we attempt to provide some initial answers to two important research questions: 
 
1.  How does family ownership impact family firms’ internationalisation? 
2.  How does family’s involvement in management and board impact family firms’ 
internationalisation? 
 
Therefore, we explore the differential impact of family ownership and family’s involvement in 
management and the board on internationalisation in publicly traded family firms. This is 
particularly important in publicly traded family firms, where family ownership and family’s 
involvement in management and the board are expected to be relatively less than those in small-
to-medium-sized family firms. Our findings show that family ownership has an inverted U-
shaped relationship with internationalisation. Thus, internationalisation increases as family 
ownership increases up to an optimum level. After an optimum level, family ownership affects 
internationalisation negatively. Within the domain of TCT, this may be owing to increased 
family human asset specificity, risk aversion because of risk-bearing, and concerns for external 
parties’ potential opportunism at higher levels of family ownership. As we also expected, 
family’s involvement in management and board has a U-shaped relationship with 
internationalisation. Family’s involvement in management and the board affects 
internationalisation positively at low and high levels and negatively at moderate levels. At low 
levels, family firms behave similar to non-family firms and engage in more internationalisation. 
As family’s involvement in management and the board increase, internationalisation begins to 
fall off. However, higher levels of family’s involvement in management and the board can lead 
to higher risk-taking, which can facilitate internationalisation. Additionally, the concerns for 
opportunism can be mitigated by the ability of larger numbers of family managers and board 
members to closely monitor and control the behaviour of external parties. The findings are 
consistent with Maury’s (2006) distinction between active and passive family controls. 
 
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, this paper is one of the first attempts to use 
TCT to explain the impact of family governance through ownership and involvement in 
management and the board on internationalisation. Not only does this add to our understanding 
of family firms and provide avenues for future research, it also suggests the value of applying 
TCT perspective to family business studies. As suggested by Memili et al. (2011a, 2011b), TCT 
elements (i.e., human asset specificity, opportunism versus trust, and risk preferences) can be 
critical in determining the efficient boundaries of publicly traded family firms. Second, we 
contribute to the family business literature by investigating the determinants of 
internationalisation. The family governance components of ownership, management, and board 
membership have differential effects on family firms’ internationalisation. Since governance 
structure appears to have an important influence on firm strategies and behaviour, more research 
on the impact of different corporate governance structures on internationalisation is needed 
within the domain of international entrepreneurship and corporate governance. 
 
5.1 Future research directions 
 
Since family firms are heterogeneous (Melin and Nordqvist, 2007), the impact of transaction cost 
factors might vary in family firms depending upon life cycle stages or the imminence of 
succession. All these factors suggest additional applications of TCT to the study of family 
businesses. 
 
Furthermore, the sample included 386 S&P 500 firms headquartered in the USA. Even though 
increased globalisation has tended to cause the business conduct of firms in different parts of the 
world to become more similar, different regulatory contexts can still result in differences in 
internationalisation. For instance, the USA exhibits a strong legal system that places limits on the 
dominance of owners and managers. We expect that family owners, managers, and board 
members may therefore have more influence on the strategies and behaviours of publicly traded 
firms in other countries. Since the regulatory context tend to vary across countries and may be 
influential to the findings of this study, future research could test or extend the model in 
countries with different corporate governance and foreign trade policies. 
 
Furthermore, the sample included 386 S&P 500 firms headquartered in the USA. Even though 
increased globalisation has tended to cause the business conduct of firms in different parts of the 
world to become more similar, different regulatory contexts can still result in differences in 
internationalisation. For instance, the USA exhibits a strong legal system that places limits on the 
dominance of owners and managers. We expect that family owners, managers, and board 
members may therefore have more influence on the strategies and behaviours of publicly traded 
firms in other countries. Since the regulatory context tend to vary across countries and may be 
influential to the findings of this study, future research could test or extend the model in 
countries with different corporate governance and foreign trade policies. 
 
In this paper, the links between the ‘components-of-involvement’ (i.e. family ownership and 
family’s involvement in management and the board) and internationalisation are examined. 
However, according to the ‘essence’ approach in defining family firms, the intentions, vision, 
familiness, and/or behaviours may be the distinctive factors distinguishing between family firms 
and non-family firms as well as among family firms (Chrisman, Chua and Sharma, 2005). Since 
the elements of the essence approach are expected to lead to differences in corporate governance 
systems in family firms, the link between family owners and/or managers intentions, vision, 
familiness, and/or behaviours (e.g. intentions for transgenerational succession and the intentions 
to preserve socioemotional wealth) and internationalisation should be investigated in future 
research. Future research can also investigate the influence of family owners, managers, and 
directors more minutely. For example, there may be other family firm-specific factors such as 
whether a family member is the CEO or Board Chair (Zahra, 2003) as well as whether the 
founder remains involved in ownership, management, and the board (Miller et al., 2007). 
Further, there are many other family involvement considerations that might influence 
internationalisation decisions because they may, among other things, affect the ability to reach 
consensus on decision-making and the importance attached to socioemotional wealth. These 
considerations include the number of generations included among owners, managers, and/or 
board members (Anderson and Reeb, 2004); the relationships between family and non-family 
members on the management team and board of directors; gender and ethnic background of the 
family members in charge; the relative ownership held by family members who are also 
managers and board members versus those who are not; and the types of relationships  that exist 
between family managers and board members (e.g. spouses, siblings, offspring, in-laws, 
cousins). 
 
Furthermore, the effects of family involvement on internationalisation might vary in family firms 
depending upon top management team characteristics, board independence (Klein, Shapiro and 
Young, 2005), leadership styles of family managers and directors (Bass, 1990), social capital 
(Sirmon and Hitt, 2003), corporate governance provisions (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003; 
Memili, Misra and Chrisman, 2012), strategic networks (Arregle et al., 2007), and image 
concerns (Memili et al., 2010). As another future research avenue, the performance of family 
versus non-family firms that internationalise can be studied. All these suggest additional avenues 
for future research concerning family firms’ internationalisation. 
 
5.2 Practical implications 
 
Families’ involvement appears to be influential on firm strategies and behaviour (i.e., 
internationalisation), even when the family holds a relatively small percentage of equity rights 
(which are still higher than those non-controlling minority shareholders) and a small number of a 
firm’s top managers and/or board positions in the US corporations. In our paper, we demonstrate 
that different family involvement levels and corporate roles result in different outcomes in terms 
of internationalisation. Interestingly, our results suggest that family ownership, with an inverted 
U-shape relationship with internationalisation, and family’s involvement in management and the 
board, with a U-shape relationship, can provide important checks and balances to inadequate or 
excess investments in internationalisation, if properly coordinated. Alternatively, there is a 
potential for them to work at cross purposes leading to higher transaction (and potentially 
agency) costs. Therefore, both family and non-family stakeholders should be vigilant concerning 
the nature of the corporate governance mechanisms used in order to maximise the positive 
effects of family involvement on shareholder wealth, particularly since family agendas may not 
always be consistent with overall firm prosperity. 
 
In conclusion, the framework presented in this paper provides a transaction cost perspective to 
family firms and their strategic decisions concerning internationalisation. We believe that future 
family business studies within the framework of TCT will result in better understanding of the 
formulation of family firms’ strategic decisions in many other areas that are beyond the scope of 
this study. 
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